Abstract
This paper examines the impact of a marginal cost increase for one firm on price and quality in a duopoly market. The results are derived theoretically and then tested empirically. The marginal cost increase is interpreted as an increase in the wage one firm pays its workers. The predictions are tested with two United States airline strikes during the 1990’s. Quality is proxied in three ways: (1) the number of flights per day, (2) the percentage of flights canceled, and (3) the percentage of flights arriving late. The results show that the strike coefficients for the effects on quality are most consistent with theoretical predictions when quality is measured as the number of flights per day. These results are encouraging because of the three measures of quality, it seems that number of flights per day is the measure of quality that is most controllable by the firm. The strike coefficients for the direct effect on price are most consistent with theoretical predictions when quality rankings are determined by the percentage of flights canceled. The strike coefficients for the total effect on price are most consistent with theoretical predictions when quality rankings are determined by the percentage of flights arriving late.