Personality Preferences and Pre-Commitment: Behavioral Explanations in
Ultimatum Games
    (co-authors Robert Shupp, Kurtis Swope, and Justin Mayer)

Abstract
This paper explores the role of personality type in explaining economic behavior. We used volunteers drawn from the student body at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) to test for correlations between dominant personality characteristics, as measured by the widely used Myers-Briggs type indicator (MBTI), and behavior in single-round ultimatum bargaining experiments. Using USNA students provided a unique opportunity to avoid the uncertain framing effects of administering a personality questionnaire either pre or post-experiment because all students completed the MBTI upon entrance to the Academy. Three experimental design details are noteworthy: (1) one variant requires responders to make a nonbinding pre-commitment rejection level prior to seeing the offer, (2) one variant requires responders to make a binding pre-commitment rejection level, and (3) one variant includes a third person (or “hostage”) who makes no decision, but whose payment depends on the proposal being accepted. The results indicate that thinking (T) types make significantly lower offers than feeling (F) types, and that extraverted (E) types pre-commit to accepting significantly lower offers than introverted (I) types. Furthermore, offers are higher when proposers know that responders make a binding pre-commitment, but are not different when a hostage is present. Responders make lower pre-commitments when they are binding and when a hostage is present.