Bucks for Ducks, or Money for Nothin'?
The Political Economy of the Federal Duck Stamp Program

Abstract

The Federal Duck Stamp Program is a wildlife conservation program created in 1934 to provide funds for the acquisition of migratory waterfowl habitat. This program embodies one of the earliest examples of a user fee established to provide environmental amenities that have public good characteristics. Three lessons follow from the duck stamp experience. First, user fees can provide a market-like solution for the provision of some environmental goods; indeed, this program was instigated by waterfowl hunters willing to pay for duck habitat to increase the number of ducks. Second, good intentions are not enough; if user fees are to be successful, their proceeds must be insulated from competing claimants; during the first 25 years of the duck stamp program, most of the receipts were spent on administrative expenses rather than habitat acquisition. Finally, user fee programs appear to be subject to the same political forces found elsewhere; when duck hunters did not get what they thought they were paying for, they turned to politics to increase funding for the program. Ultimately, the duck stamp program shows that the insulation of market solutions from political forces is easier said than done.