By Flavius Vegetius
Renatus
Translated from the Latin by Lieutenant John Clarke
Text written in 390 A.D. British translation published in 1767
Copyright Expired
Etext version by Mads Brevik (2001).
THE ROMAN DISCIPLINE THE CAUSE OF THEIR
GREATNESS
Victory in war does not depend entirely upon numbers or mere courage; only
skill and
discipline will insure it. We find that the Romans owed the conquest of
the world to no
other cause than continual military training, exact observance of discipline
in their
camps and unwearied cultivation of the other arts of war. Without these,
what chance
would the inconsiderable numbers of the Roman armies have had against the
multitudes of the Gauls? Or with what success would their small size have
been opposed
to the prodigious stature of the Germans? The Spaniards surpassed us not
only in
numbers, but in physical strength. We were always inferior to the Africans
in wealth and
unequal to them in deception and stratagem. And the Greeks, indisputably,
were far
superior to us in skill in arts and all kinds of knowledge.
But to all these advantages the Romans opposed unusual care in the choice
of their
levies and in their military training. They thoroughly understood the importance
of
hardening them by continual practice, and of training them to every maneuver
that
might happen in the line and in action. Nor were they less strict in punishing
idleness
and sloth. The courage of a soldier is heightened by his knowledge of his
profession,
and he only wants an opportunity to execute what he is convinced he has
been perfectly
taught. A handful of men, inured to war, proceed to certain victory, while
on the contrary
numerous armies of raw and undisciplined troops are but multitudes of men
dragged to
slaughter.
THE DRILL CALLED ARMATURA
The new levies also should be taught by the masters at arms the system
of drill called
armatura, as it is still partly kept up among us. Experience even at this
time convinces
us that soldiers, perfect therein, are of the most service in engagements.
And they
afford certain proofs of the importance and effects of discipline in the
difference we see
between those properly trained in this branch of drill and the other troops.
The old
Romans were so conscious of its usefulness that they rewarded the masters
at arms
with a double allowance of provision. The soldiers who were backward in
this drill were
punished by having their allowance in barley. Nor did they receive it as
usual, in wheat,
until they had, in the presence of the prefect, tribunes, or other principal
officers of the
legion, showed sufficient proofs of their knowledge of every part of their
study.
No state can either be happy or secure that is remiss and negligent in
the discipline of
its troops. For it is not profusion of riches or excess of luxury that
can influence our
enemies to court or respect us. This can only be effected by the terror
of our arms. It is
an observation of Cato that. misconduct in the common affairs of life may
be retrieved,
but that it is quite otherwise in war, where errors are fatal and without
remedy, and are
followed by immediate punishment. For the consequences of engaging an enemy,
without skill or courage, is that part of the army is left on the field
of battle, and those
who remain receive such an impression from their defeat that they dare
not afterwards
look the enemy in the face.
CARE TO PROVIDE FORAGE AND PROVISIONS
Famine makes greater havoc in an army than the enemy, and is more terrible
than the
sword. Time and opportunity may help to retrieve other misfortunes, but
where forage
and provisions have not been carefully provided, the evil is without remedy.
The main
and principal point in war is to secure plenty of provisions and to destroy
tIle enemy by
famine. An exact calculation must therefore be made before the commencement
of the
war as to the number of troops and the expenses incident thereto, so that
the provinces
may in plenty of time furnish the forage, corn, and all other kinds of
provisions
demanded of them to be transported. They must be in more than sufficient
quantity,
and gathered into the strongest and most convenient cities before the opening
of the
campaign. If the provinces cannot raise their quotas in kind, they must
commute for
them in money to be employed in procuring all things requisite for the
service. For the
possessions of the subjects cannot be kept secure otherwise than by the
defense of
arms.
These precautions often become doubly necessary as a siege is sometimes
protracted
beyond expectation, the besiegers resolving to suffer themselves all the
inconveniences
of want sooner than raise the siege, if they have any hopes of reducing
the place by
famine. Edicts should be issued out requiring the country people to convey
their cattle,
grain, wine and all kinds of provisions that may be of service to the enemy,
into
garrisoned fortresses or into the safest cities. And if they do not comply
with the order,
proper officers are to appointed to compel them to do it. The inhabitants
of the province
must likewise be obliged to retire with their effects into some fortified
place before the
irruption of the enemy. The fortifications and all the machines of different
kinds must
also be examined and repaired in time. For if you are once surprised by
the enemy
before you are in a proper posture of defense, you are thrown into irrecoverable
confusion, and you can no longer draw any assistance from the neighboring
places, all
communication with them being cut off. But a faithful management of the
magazines
and a frugal distribution of the provisions, with proper precautions taken
at first, will
insure sufficient plenty. When provisions once begin to fail, parsimony
is ill-timed and
comes too late.
On difficult expeditions the ancients distributed the provisions at a fixed
allowance to
each man without distinction of rank; and when the emergency was past,
the
government accounted for the full proportions. The troops should never
want wood and
forage in winter or water in summer. They should have corn, wine, vinegar,
and even
salt, in plenty at all times. Cities and fortresses are garrisoned by such
mcn as are least
fit for thc service of the field. They arc provided with all sorts of arnms,
arrows, fustibali,
slings, stones, onagri and balistae for their defense. Great caution is
requisite that the
unsuspecting simplicity of the inhabitants be not imposed on by the treachery
or perjury
of the enemy, for pretended conferences and deceitful appearance of truces
have often
been more fatal than force. By observing the foregoing precautions, the
besieged may
have it in their power to ruin the enemy by famine, if he keeps his troops
together, and
if he divides.them, by frequent sallies and surprises.
GENERAL MAXIMS
It is the nature of war that what is beneficial to you is detrimental to
the enemy and
what is of service to him always hurts you. It is therefore a maxim never
to do, or to
omit doing, anything as a consequence of his actions, but to consult invariably
your own
interest only. And you depart from this interest whenever you imitate such
measures as
he pursues for his benefit. For the same reason it would be wrong for him
to follow such
steps as you take for your advantage.
The more your troops have been accustomed to camp duties on frontier stations
and the
more carefully they have been disciplined, the less danger they will be
exposed to in the
field.
Men must be sufficiently tried before they are led against the enemy.
It is much better to overcome the enemy by famine, surprise or terror than
by general
actions, for in the latter instance fortune has often a greater share than
valor. Those
designs are best which the enemy are entirely ignorant of till the moment
of execution.
Opportunity in war is often more to be depended on than courage.
To debauch the enemy's soldiers and encourage them when sincere in surrendering
themselves, is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion
than by
slaughter.
It is better to have several bodies of reserves than to extend your front too much.
A general is not easily overcome who can form a true judgment of his own
and the
enemy's forces.
Valor is superior to numbers.
The nature of the ground is often of nmore consequence than courage.
Few men are born brave; many become so through care and force of discipline.
An army is strengthened by labor and enervated by idleness.
Troops are not to be led to battle unless confident of success.
Novelty and surprise throw an enemy into consternation; but common incidents
have no
effect.
He who rashly pursues a flying enemy with troops in disorder, seems inclined
to resign
that victory which he had before obtained.
An army unsupplied with grain and other necessary provisions will be vanquished
without
striking a blow.
A general whose troops are superior both in number and bravery should engage
in the
oblong square, which is the first formation.
He who judges himself inferior should advance his right wing obliquely
against the
enemy's left. This is the second formation.
If your left wing is strongest, you must attack the enemy's right according
to the third
formation.
The general who can depend on the discipline of his men should begin the
engagement
by attacking both the enemy's wings at once, the fourth formation.
He whose light infantry is good should cover his center by forming them
in its front and
charge both the enemy's wings at once. This is the fifth formation.
He who cannot depend either on the number or courage of his troops, if
obliged to
engage, should begin the action with his right and endeavor to break the
enemy's left,
the rest of his army remaining formed in a line perpendicular to the front
and extended
to the rear like a javelin. This is the sixth formation.
If your forces are few and weak in comparison to the enemy, you must make
use of the
seventh formation and cover one of your flanks either with an eminence,
a city, the sea,
a river or some protection of that kind.
A general who trusts to his cavalry should choose the proper ground for
them and
employ them principally in the action.
He who depends on his infantry should choose a situation most proper for
them and
make most use of their service.
When an enemy's spy lurks in the camp, order all your soldiers in the day
time to their
tents, and he will instantly be apprehended.
On finding the enemy has notice of your designs, you must immediately alter
your plan
of operations.
Consult with many on proper measures to be taken, but communicate the plans
you
intend to put in execution to few, and those only of the most assured fidelity;
or rather
trust no one but yourself.
Punishment, and fear thereof, are necessary to keep soldiers in order in
quarters; but in
the field they are more influenced by hope and rewards.
Good officers never engage in general actions unless induced by opportunity
or obliged
by necessity.
To distress the enemy more by famine than the sword is a mark of consummate skill.
Many instructions might be given with regard to the cavalry. But as this
branch of the
service has been brought to perfection since the ancient writers and considerable
improvements have been made in their drills and maneuvers, their arms,
and the
quality and management of their horses, nothing can be collected from their
works. Our
present mode of discipline is sufficient.
Dispositions for action must be carefully concealed from the enemy, lest
they should
counteract them and defeat your plans by proper expedients.
This abridgment of the most eminent military writers, invincible Emperor,
contains the
maxims and instructions they have left us, approved by different ages and
confirmed by
repeated experience. The Persians admire your skill in archery; the Huns
and Alans
endeavor in vain to imitate your dexterity in horsemanship; the Saracens
and Indians
cannot equal your activity in the hunt; and even the masters at arms pique
themselves
on only part of that knowledge and expertness of which you give so many
instances in
their own profession. How glorious it is therefore for Your Majesty with
all these
qualifications to unite the science of war and the art of conquest, and
to convince the
world that by Your conduct and courage You are equally capable of performing
the duties
of the soldier and the general!
* An instrument with four points so designed that when any three of them
are on the
ground the fourth projects upward. These are extensively used today for
antitank
barriers.